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Abstract: 
This paper aims to shed light on the complexities and difficulties in predicting the effects of trust and the 
experience of online auction participants on bid levels in online auctions. To provide some insights into learning 
by bidders, a field study was conducted first to examine auction and bidder characteristics from eBay auctions of 
rare coins. We proposed that such learning is partly because of institutional-based trust. Data were then 
gathered from 453 participants in an online experiment and survey, and a structural equation model was used 
to analyze the results. This paper reveals that experience has a nonmonotonic effect on the levels of online 
auction bids. Contrary to previous research on traditional auctions, as online auction bidders gain more 
experience, their level of institutional-based trust increases and leads to higher bid levels. Data also show that 
both a bidder’s selling and bidding experiences increase bid levels, with the selling experience having a 
somewhat stronger effect. This paper offers an in-depth study that examines the effects of experience and 
learning and bid levels in online auctions. We postulate this learning is because of institutional-based trust. 
Although personal trust in sellers has received a significant amount of research attention, this paper addresses 
an important gap in the literature by focusing on institutional-based trust. 
Keywords: online auction, electronic markets, trust behavior, selling and bidding experience, learning 
Introduction 
Information technologies, especially the Internet, have significantly changed the way people exchange 
information and participate in business transactions. They have enabled electronic commerce (EC) business 
models whose reach and scope were unattainable in traditional markets. Online auctions especially represent a 
robust and profitable retail business model. eBay, the premier online auction retailer, boasted 167 million global 
active buyers in 2016 and $84 billion in gross merchandise volume (GMV) (eBay, 2017). This reflects a year over 
year increase of both active buyers and GMV and underscores the revenue generating power of online auctions. 
Just as the rate of participation and volume of online auctions have increased, so have the incidents of fraud in 
these transactions. In the fourth quarter of 2015, 27 fraud attacks occurred for every 1000 e-commerce 
transactions, a 215% increase from the first quarter of the same year (Meola, 2016). According to a report by the 
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (2016), 288,012 individual 
complaints of Internet-based crime occurred in 2015, a number estimated to be only 15% of the actual instances 
of fraud perpetrated. Of those complaints that included a monetary loss (127,145), the average was $8,421. 
Online fraud has had a significant impact on U.S. online retailers; estimates show a loss of 1.3% of all revenues in 
2015 (Meola, 2016). Auction-based fraud is a significant portion of this Internet-based fraud, ranking fourth in 
prevalence after nonpayment/nondelivery scams, 419/overpayment scams, and identity theft.  
Institutions that host online auctions have undertaken various protective measures to address these problems. 
For example, eBay offers escrow services that withhold a buyer’s payment to the seller until the buyer has 
received the merchandise and reported his or her satisfaction with the transaction. Similarly, payment services 
such as PayPal protect buyers by securely storing a buyer’s payment information so that a buyer does not need 
to share any financial information with a seller.  
Research has shown that these mechanisms help build institutional trust—the comfort and sense of protection a 
consumer has with a specific business (Hu, Lin, Whinston, & Zhang, 2004; Pavlou, 2002; Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). 
Trust is an important consideration for traditional retailers because trustworthy sellers can charge more as 
buyers experience satisfactory transactions over time (C. Shapiro, 1982). Similarly, online retail transactions 
have been shown to increase trust as shoppers gain more experience with online retailers (Gefen, Karahanna, & 
Straub, 2003). 
This exposes an important conflict in the literature between traditional transactions and online auctions with 
respect to experience. Lambert (1972) argues that inexperienced buyers in traditional transactions are unwilling 
to pay as much as highly experienced buyers because highly experienced buyers are more confident of increased 
quality. However, auction research suggests that inexperienced bidders have a higher willingness to pay 
(overbid), paying more than the expected value for items (Kagel & Richard, 2001) - a phenomenon  known as the 
Winner’s Curse. In our research, we investigated the complex relationships between bidder experience, learning 
behavior, and institutional-based trust.  
We first conducted a field study by observing data from winning bids in 24,579 rare coin auctions to examine 
how experience affected a buyer’s final bid. We then undertook to understand this learning effect by conducting 
an online survey of 453 subjects who also participated in an experiment in which each respondent entered 25 
bids in different online auctions.  
This paper offers an in-depth examination of the effects of buyer experience and learning behavior on the bid 
levels of buyers in online auctions. We empirically demonstrated how institutional-based trust and its effect on 
bid levels could explain learning behavior. In addition, we found that in online auctions inexperienced bidders 
discount their bid levels because they lack this institutional-based trust and that the skills and abilities to find 
items at lower prices exist only at much higher levels of bidder experience.  
Theoretical Foundations 
In this section, we examine the literature on the role of experience in auctions and how bidder experience 
relates to institutional-based trust in online markets. 
Experience and Auction Bid Levels 
Several studies have examined how experience relates to bid levels. If all bidders derive a common valuation of 
an item from a distribution, only the highest valuation will win the auction. Moreover, this highest valuation, 
often from inexperienced bidders, will typically exceed the expected common value of most auction 
participants, Kagel and Richard (2001) found that in traditional auctions inexperienced bidders bid higher than 
experienced bidders. However, Easley, Wood, and Barkataki (2010) found that experienced bidders in online 
auctions tend to gravitate toward bidding patterns that reduce their bid levels. These findings suggest a 
conclusion that experienced bidders in both traditional and online auctions change their bidding patterns and 
behavior to identify and win auctions with lower bids. Thus, we should see a decrease in the bid levels for items 
as a buyer’s experience increases because experienced buyers are better able to judge the value of items sold in 
online auctions. 
Experience, Learning, and Institutional-Based Trust 
Information asymmetry occurs when one party in a transaction has more information than the other party. 
Information asymmetry, and its effect on electronic market transactions, is of special interest to electronic 
market researchers because the Internet changes the way a seller’s information flows to the buyer. Ba, 
Whinston and Zhang (2003) described how information asymmetry can exist in electronic markets in the areas 
of product characteristics, seller identity, and seller characteristics. Existing research also recognizes trust as a 
necessary facilitator in online transactions (Bhattacherjee, 2002; Lowry, Vance, Moody, Beckman, & Read, 
2008).  Anonymous Internet sellers can mask their identities as well as the quality of the products they sell, thus 
increasing various forms of information asymmetry with a reduced risk of detection and punishment. Ba and 
Pavlou (2002) emphasize that because of the increase in information asymmetry in these areas, a buyer’s trust 
in a seller is more critical for successful transactions in electronic markets, like online auctions, than in 
traditional markets.  
Learning — or specifically bidder learning — happens when bidding strategy changes over time because of 
accumulated experience (Srinivasan and Wang 2010) without regard to whether a bidder wins. Wang and Hu 
(2009) infer bidding learning directly from prior experiences and this bidder learning “transcends categories” 
rather than limited to certain product (Srinivasan and Wang 2010). Wang and Hu (2009) tracked new bidders 
and observed their bidding behavior over time. They showed that novice bidders learned from their experience 
and followed the conventions of the learning literature (Darr et al. 1995); they defined experience in their study 
as the actual number of auctions in which a bidder participated. We would expect that with more experience, a 
bidder learns to adopt a strategy that will result in a winning bid. 
Beyond trust in an individual seller, Zucker (1986) identified institutional-based trust as one of the major types 
of trust formed on the basis of an institution’s guarantees, safety nets, or other structures that help individuals 
transact business. McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar (2002) discussed the two aspects of institutional-based 
trust: situational normality and structural assurances. Situational normality deals with understanding the social 
norms that exist within an institution or, in this research, a marketplace.  
Structural assurance, on the other hand, is defined as guarantees and constructs an institution provides that 
deter opportunistic behavior and thus facilitate more successful transactions (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 
1998). Pennington, Wilcox, and Grover (2003) examined structural assurances that lead to trust in an underlying 
transactional technology platform. They showed that guarantees can lead to increased system trust and 
increased perceived vendor trust, which in turn lead to an increase in the purchase intent of a buyer. For 
example, eBay can remove a badly behaving seller or even identify such a seller to permit the instigation of legal 
proceedings. Shapiro (1982) discussed structural safeguards such as regulations, guarantees, and legal recourse 
and found that all of them have a positive effect on institutional-based trust. For example, eBay’s feedback 
mechanism can not only potentially punish an untrustworthy seller but also enable a trustworthy seller to 
receive a price premium. Shapiro (1982) pointed out that reputation can be considered a structural safeguard, in 
that vendors who act opportunistically will face a customer backlash that will result in reduced bid levels 
because consumers will refuse to pay as much for an opportunistic seller’s goods. As a result, eBay’s feedback 
mechanism acts as a structural safeguard in that sellers will avoid acting opportunistically so as to ensure their 
ability to derive the highest possible bid prices for their products. 
Research has shown that customers’ trust is shaped through their experiences (Gefen et al., 2003). Even if their 
initial trust of another party is low, experience with this other party brings familiarity, which significantly 
influences their intended behavior. In an online auction setting, once a buyer understands the social norms of an 
institution or has enough successful transactions with different sellers in a marketplace, we posit that he or she 
will develop institutional-based trust that will lead to trust in the sellers in a marketplace because a buyer will 
generalize about the behavior of the rest of the sellers based on his or her dealings with a few sellers. Such a 
buyer believes that the social norms of the sellers preclude opportunistic behavior. For example, if an eBay 
bidder has made several purchases and has received the items as promised, that bidder will begin to believe 
that opportunistic behavior is the exception, not the norm, in the online auction environment.  
Based upon the findings of these researchers, we should expect to see an increase in the bid levels from highly 
experienced bidders because institutional-based trust increases with experience, and experienced buyers would 
not feel a need to discount their bid levels because of feelings of distrust.  
Research Model and Hypotheses 
Thus far we have examined what we categorize as two bodies of research. One body of research predicts, and 
empirically shows, that bid levels decrease as experience increases, but  the other body of research, based on an 
examination of institutional-based trust, predicts that bid levels increase with experience. In this section, we will 
undertake to reconcile these two viewpoints by using a conceptual model that illustrates the effects of 
experience on price.  
Experience is a multifaceted variable that demonstrates a subject’s level of understanding of price levels and 
best bidding practices for items bought in online auctions.  Experience can be gained in several ways: length of 
time that a person has participated in online auctions, the amount of online auction activity that the subject has 
engaged in, and the number of auctions the person has won. Like Kagel and Richard (2001) and others, we 
contend that as bidders gain experience, they are better able to determine good deals from bad ones and thus 
decrease their bid levels over time. Therefore, in general, 
H1a: Bidders with more bidding experience in online auctions have lower bid levels.  
H1b: Bidders with more selling experience in online auctions have lower bid levels. 
We posit here that part of a bidder’s learning is to better understand who he or she is dealing with. This 
understanding also safeguards the bidder in submitting a successful bid without fear of being cheated. 
Institutional-based trust is trust affected by the safeguards that an institution has in place and by a subject’s 
sense of being secure when dealing with that institution. One debatable subject is how different forms of trust 
develop. McKnight, Choudhury and Kacmar (2002) and Robert, Denis, and Hung (2009) pointed out the 
existence of two divergent viewpoints on trust development, one from cognitive-based trust research and the 
other from knowledge-based trust research. The cognitive-based trust literature embodies the concept of “swift 
trust”; in this approach, trusting beliefs form relatively quickly and before an individual has meaningful 
information about the object in question. This rapid formation of trust is because of social categorization, 
reputation, illusions (e.g., irrational thinking), disposition, institutional roles and structures, or the need to 
immediately cooperate on a task (McKnight et al., 1998; Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996; Xu, Feng, Wu, & 
Zhao, 2007). In contrast, the knowledge-based trust literature derived from management and economic 
research posits that trust develops gradually and must be built through experiential social exchange (Blau, 1964; 
Greiner & Wang, 2007; Lewicki, 1995; Luhmann, 1979; Pavlou & Gefen, 2004; Ring & van de Ven, 1994; D. L. 
Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992). 
When examining institutional-based trust, an argument can then be made that if trust is gained immediately (or 
nearly so), then one would expect no relationship between experience and institutional-based trust. Conversely, 
if trust develops through experience, we should see an increase in institutional-based trust as experience 
increases. We hypothesize that experience is necessary to develop institutional-based trust: 
H2: Increased bidder experience with online auctions leads to higher institutional-based trust. 
Moreover, previous research suggests that trustworthy sellers receive price premiums for their products (Ba & 
Pavlou, 2002; Dellarocas & Wood, 2008; C. Shapiro, 1982). Because institutional-based trust increases with 
experience, it is reasonable to expect that highly experienced bidders are willing to bid at higher levels because 
of a relatively higher level of such trust.  
H3: Institutional-based trust is associated with higher bid levels in online auctions. 
Control Variables 
We used two control variables, supported by the literature, for how they affect experience and institutional-
based trust. These variables are propensity to search and propensity for innovation.  
Propensity to search describes how likely a subject is to search for related information from others before 
deciding to bid. This includes searches from previous transactions as well as an examination of current 
transactions involving similar or identical items. Many researchers have noted that consumers build both a 
higher level of experience as well as a higher level of trust after searching for information online. For instance, 
Lim et al. (2006) described how recommendations from similar individuals tend to increase trust among first-
time purchasers. This is especially relevant in the online auction environment with its thousands of sellers 
present at any given time as well as a likelihood that any given transaction will be made by a bidder who has not 
dealt with a particular seller before. Menon et al. (2003) discussed how patients have more trust in prescription 
drug information after searching, and Ray, Ow, and Kim (2011) discussed how online search activity can lead to 
trust in the same way that experience does. Luan et al. (2016) discussed consumers’ online review search 
behavior on the various types of products reviewed. Much research from the information systems and 
economics bodies of literature puts forth the premise that the reputation reported by others is vital to 
establishing a higher willingness to pay for an item (Dellarocas & Wood, 2008; C. Shapiro, 1982). However, more 
recent research describes how, with higher priced items, consumers form trust based on argument content 
rather than on heuristic cues such as the source being an independent party’s opinion (D. Kim & Benbasat, 
2009). Hence, the effect of online comments, and the effect of searching through online comments, is still an 
important topic for research.  
Propensity for innovation describes how likely a person is to adopt new technology that may be interesting or 
profitable. This construct gauges the likelihood of adoption of new and different technologies or of new areas 
that use familiar technology. Previous research has illustrated a positive relationship between innovation and 
trust. For example, Wang, Yeung, and Zhang (2011) surveyed Chinese managers and found that managers’ 
innovation and trust share a positive relationship in supply chain transactions. Agag and El-Masry (Agag & El-
Masry, 2016) discussed the relationship between innovation and trust and its effects on online travel purchases. 
Rese and Baier (2011) showed how trust and innovation are related in successful research and development 
within a firm. In keeping with these findings, we included as a control variable that an individual’s readiness to 
accept innovation will lead to increased trust. 
The relationships between experience and trust to bidders’ winning bid levels was then studied in the following 
hypothesized model (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 – Research Model 
Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a field study on the relationships between various levels of experience 
and the final winning bid price. Following the field study, we conducted an online survey and experiment. In our 
experiment, we used respondents obtained from an online survey service. We contacted the respondents and 
paid them to participate in our experiment and directed them to our online site. To add to the respondents’ 
motivation to bid, we offered a free popular mobile device to a randomly selected bidder whose response was 
used in our study. 
Field Study  
To gather insights into auction behavior, we collected eBay auction data to investigate the winning bids paid in 
auctions and the characteristics of the winning bidders. Several auction researchers (Bapna, Goes, & Gupta, 
2001; Kauffman & Wood, 2006; Lucking Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, & Reeves, 2007) have examined bidder behavior 
and identified factors that may affect the willingness of a bidder to pay more or less for an item on eBay. These 
factors include the number of bids, the existence of a picture, the level of the starting bid in relation to the 
item’s value, and the magnitude of the average selling price. Therefore, our field study includes these variables 
in addition to the focal variables.  
In this field study, we examined 24,579 rare coin auctions on eBay over a nine-month period. These auctions 
included items from 3,938 sellers and 9,724 buyers. Each rare coin in these auctions was identified by mint year 
(e.g., 1888, 1796, etc.), denomination (e.g., nickel, half cent, etc.), condition (a number between 3 and 70, e.g., 8 
for VG8, 50 for AU50, etc.), and mintmarks (Doubled Die, CC for Carson City Mint, FBL for Full Bell Lines, etc.). To 
determine the average price paid for these coins, we considered only auctions that received at least one bid and 
only coins bid upon in at least five different auctions. Any coins with a secret reserve price or that used the “buy 
it now” feature were excluded.  Our data set includes auction information (e.g., ending time, selling price, etc.), 
as well as seller and bidder information (e.g., number of comments for items bought and sold, etc.). 
Our field study examined how the selling and buying experiences affected bid levels and controlled for the 
factors identified as affecting the final bid price. We also investigated the effect of bidding experience (H1a) and 
selling experience (H1b) on bid levels. Equation (1) and Table 6 describe the empirical model and variables used 
in this study. 
LN (SellingPrice ac / AverageSellingPrice c ) = β0+ β1 BiddingExperiencea 
+ β2 SellingExperiencea + β3 SellerRating a + β4 Number for Sale c + β5Picture a 
+ β6 LN(Starting Bid a / Average Selling Price c ) + β7 Bids a + ε (1) 
 
Table 1 – Variables Used in the Empirical Models 
Variable Description 
LN(SellingPriceac / 
AverageSellingPricec) 
Dependent variable describing a bidder’s bid levels, operationalized by the log of 
the selling price of coin c in auction a as a percentage of the log average price of 
all coins sold. Note that the current coin is excluded from the average price. 
BiddingExperiencea The log of the number of comments previously received by winning bidder b from 
buying an item before the transaction closing time in auction a. This variable is a 
proxy for a buyer’s buying experience. 
SellingExperiencea The log of the number of comments previously received by winning bidder b from 
selling an item before the transaction closing time in auction a. This variable is a 
proxy for a buyer’s selling experience. 
SellerRatinga The log of the reputation score reported by eBay. This variable is a proxy for a 
seller’s trustworthiness and is used to control for any seller-level trust effects 
Number for Salec The number of times coin c was featured in an auction during this study. This 
variable controls for competition across auctions. 
Picturea Dummy variable for the existence of a picture. 
Starting Bida /Average 
Selling Pricec 
The ratio of the starting bid of an item in an auction as a proportion of the 
average selling price for that item across auctions. 
Bids a The number of bids received in auction a. This controls for level of interest in the 
auction. 
 
Field Study Results 
Table 2 shows the results of our empirical model. Overall, both the bidding and selling experiences relate 
positively to winning bid levels when bidders at all experience levels are considered together. Therefore, it 
makes sense to examine our data further at different experience levels. Because of the challenge of 
understanding individual bid behavior as the bidders gained experience, we decided to do a cross-sectional 
analysis. We relied on feedback ratings posted on eBay as proxy. Srinivasan and Wang (2010) indicated that if 
the rating is a random subset of total experience, it is not as problematic to use it as proxy. 
Table 2 – How Experience Affects Selling Price for Buyers and Sellers 
Variable Hypothesis Coeff. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t-stat 95% Confidence Interval 
Constant  -0.4323 0.0178 -24.33*** {-0.4672, -0.3975} 
BiddingExperiencea H1a 0.0074 0.0013 5.61*** {0.0048, 0.0100} 
SellingExperiencea H1b 0.0080 0.0011 7.32*** {0.0058, 0.0101} 
SellerRatinga  0.0187 0.0013 14.28*** {0.0161, 0.0213} 
Number for Salec  -0.0005 0.0000 -14.14*** {-0.0006, -0.0005} 
Picturea  0.0177 0.0148 1.20*** {-0.0113, 0.0466} 
Starting Bida / Average Selling Pricec  0.3106 0.0060 51.89*** {0.2989, 0.3223} 
Bidsa  0.1160 0.0019 61.58*** {0.1123, 0.1197} 
***p-value < .001; Sample Size = 24,579; R2 =35.5%;  
Dependent variable: LN (Selling Price ac / AverageSellingPrice c) 
 
We used K-means cluster analysis to force three levels of factors that use a bidder’s selling experience, buying 
experience, and bid levels. This was done to examine the low, medium, and high bid levels. Table 3 shows the 
effects of the bidding and selling experiences across the three clusters. For a bidder’s bidding experience, we 
detected a significant relationship in the first cluster, no relationship in the second, and a negative relationship 
in the third. For a bidder’s selling experience, we showed a strong positive relationship in the first cluster, a 
relatively weaker relationship in the second, and no relationship in the third. 
The results in Table 3 are consistent with our theoretical model that at lower levels of experience, new bidders 
initially discount their bids, but bidders with moderately more experience learn from their experience and bid at 
higher levels. In our data set, only bidders with relatively high levels of experience appear to have the ability to 
find the best deals and enter bids that win auctions at lower bid levels.  
Table 3 – Cluster Robust Regression Results Based Upon Bidder Experience1 
 
 
Variable 
Cluster 1 
Winning 
Bidder 
Score 
From 0 
to 46 
  Cluster 2 
Winning 
Bidder 
Score 
From 47 
to 152 
  Cluster 3 
Winning 
Bidder 
Score 
From 153 
to 349 
  
 Coeff Std Err t-stat Coeff Std Err t-stat Coeff Std Err t-stat 
Constant -0.400 0.027 -14.98*** -0.441 0.063 -7.04*** 0.328 0.237 1.38*** 
BiddingE
xperienc
ea 
0.006 0.002 3.67*** 0.003 0.014 0.20*** -0.126 0.046 -2.74*** 
SellingEx
periencea 
0.012 0.002 5.78*** 0.005 0.002 3.45*** 0.001 0.004 0.14*** 
SellerRati
nga 
0.020 0.002 11.16*** 0.017 0.002 8.36*** 0.013 0.005 2.55*** 
 
1 These results were duplicated with second bidder analysis as well with similar results. As a check for robustness, similar 
results were obtained with no natural log transformation of dependent or independent variables, although the result was 
not as strong. 
Number 
for Salec 
0.000 0.000 -9.89*** -0.001 0.000 -9.89*** 0.000 0.000 -2.95*** 
Picturea 0.014 0.020 0.67*** 0.037 0.023 1.61*** -0.119 0.065 -1.85*** 
Starting 
Bida / 
Average 
Selling 
Pricec 
0.315 0.008 39.20*** 0.302 0.010 31.54*** 0.330 0.024 13.83*** 
Bidsa 0.115 0.003 45.21*** 0.117 0.003 40.11*** 0.122 0.008 15.42*** 
 Sample 
Size = 
13,694; 
R2 
=36.0% 
  Sample 
Size=9,72
8; 
R2 
=34.5% 
  Sample 
Size = 
1,157; R2 
=38.4% 
  
Note: Dependent variable: Bid Level, operationalized by LN(SellingPriceac/AverageSellingPricec), *p<.05; 
**p<.01; ***p<.001 
Table 3 and Figure 2 show that bidders with moderate levels of experience in both selling and bidding (proxied 
by the bidder comments received for selling activity and buying activity, respectively) are willing to pay more 
than bidders with lesser levels of experience.  We posit that trust is in play because it is one of few constructs 
that we proposed that will increase winning bid levels as proposed in H3. We assert that through the learning 
process of auctions, the moderate bidder develops trust and hence pays a premium over the novice bidder. The 
belief in the interplay of trust and experience yielded the results shown in Table 3 and Figure 2. We proceeded 
with the next study to further understand if the manifestation of trust can explain this result. 
 
Figure 2 – Bidder Experience as It Relates to Price Paid for Winning Bidders2 
Online Survey and Experiment 
Because we are unable to observe any variable in eBay auctions that allows us to understand the trust level of 
bidders, we conducted a survey to examine if trust increases with experience and, if so, how it affects the 
winning bid level. We conducted an online experiment and survey and then a field study to examine the effect 
of experience and institutional-based trust on the final bid price. In our experiment, we used subjects obtained 
through an online survey service that contacted and paid respondents to participate in our experiment and 
 
2 Note that experiences levels are discrete integers. Although we tried to divide the bidders in Figure 2 into equal bins, 
18,850 of the 24,579 bidders in our study had no selling experience. Hence, the first bar in Figure 2 contains the majority of 
bidders, and the remaining bars divide the remaining bidders more or less equally. 
directed them to our online site. To add to the respondents’ motivation to bid, we offered a free popular 
portable audio/video player to a randomly selected bidder whose response was used in our study. 
The survey service contacted 2000 people, 467 of whom completed our experiment and survey. Incomplete 
experiments and surveys were discarded. As suggested by Ray, Ow, and Kim (2011), we removed subjects who 
had extremely low experiment times (e.g., subjects who finished 38 questions and 25 bid scenarios in less than 
two minutes). In addition, as suggested by Neter et al. (1996), we removed outlying subjects whose bid levels 
were three standard deviations away from the mean for an item. These two measures resulted in the removal of 
14 subjects, and our final data set contained 453 subjects who each entered 25 bids and completed the online 
survey. Thus, we can analyze a total of 11,325 bids. Table 4 shows the demographic data of our respondents. 
The goal of our empirical methodology was to measure actual bid levels through an experiment and then use a 
survey to estimate values for the latent variables in our model, comparing them to the actual bids in the 
experiment. Researchers point out that self-reporting bias can corrupt results and lead to common method bias, 
so asking about bid levels in a survey would not be as effective as observing bids within an experimental setting. 
When the subjects came to our experiment website, they first encountered an instruction page that explained 
the rules of the experiment. Each respondent then bid 25 times in situations/scenarios in which we varied the 
parameters of the experiment (different levels of seller reputation LOW vs. MODERATE vs. HIGH, different 
auction hosts, different institutional factors such as escrow, credit cards, pay services like PayPal, etc.).  
Table 4 – Demographic Data from Survey Respondents 
Level Percentage 
Generation  
1930s 1.4 
1940s 5.9 
1950s 16.3 
1960s 26.9 
1970s 30.8 
1980s 18.1 
1990s 0.6 
  
Gender  
Male  65.3 
Female  34.7 
  
Education  
No high school 0.8 
High school graduate or GED 7.3 
Some college credit, no degree 20.3 
Associate degree 12.4 
Bachelor degree 41.8 
Some graduate courses 4.9 
Graduate degree 12.3 
  
Income/year  
Up to $9,999 3.2 
$10,000–$29,999 6.8 
$30,000–$49,999 15.7 
$50,000 to $74,999 25.8 
$75,000 to $99,999 27.7 
$100,000 to $499,999 19.5 
$500,000 or more 1.3 
 
In our experiment, we allowed (but did not force) the respondents to search through similar auctions at any 
time during the experiment. Then respondents had the goal of entering appropriate bids on a popular portable 
audio/video player in 25 auctions. The make and model of the product never changed. We varied the auctions 
by the hosting institution (between a well-known online auction site, eBay, and a mock auction site that we 
created for this experiment, CrazyAuctions). We also varied the payment processing credit card handler 
between a well-known payment processing service, PayPal, and a payment processor that we created, 
ChargeBuddy. The goal of creating these new entities was to compare unknown vendors with vendors who have 
a proven track record. 
The product descriptions used in the various auctions in the experiment were designed to be generic, yet 
explanatory, and were taken from actual eBay auctions. We varied the display photo, using either a stock photo 
or a seller-provided photo (also taken from an eBay auction). In addition, we manipulated the number of 
bidders, the seller comments received, and the percentage of positive and negative comments. We also varied 
an escrow option so that some auctions indicated that the money was kept by a third party until the buyer 
received the merchandise.  
Finally, we gave the subject an opportunity to search for similar items at any time during the experiment. The 
variables examined in our bid experiment are shown in Table 2. Research has shown that simulated policy-
capturing results are able to replicate real-world experiments (Olson, Dell'Omo, & Jarley, 1987). Webster and 
Trevino (1995) advocated the use of the method as a valuable adjunct to a survey method. The external validity 
of the method has been verified previously by Levin et al. (1983).  
Immediately after the auctions, the subjects were directed to a survey page that contained 11 questions. These 
questions (see Appendix) were designed to permit examination of four latent variables—institutional-based 
trust, experience, propensity for innovation, and propensity for search—not directly observable. It was 
emphasized to the subjects that to qualify to win the product, they must answer all the questions. Established 
instruments were used to examine the latent variables. See the Appendix for the survey instrument. 
Table 5 – Variables Examined in the Auction Experiment 
Variable Description 
Bid Level The nominal bid amount entered by a subject in our experiment. 
Search in Experiment The percentage of auctions in which the bidder performed searches. 
Seller Experience The number of positive comments that a hypothetical seller receives in our 
experiment, reported to the subject. 
Seller Reputation The percentage of positive comments that a hypothetical seller receives in our 
experiment, reported to the subject. 
Escrow A dummy variable indicating if an escrow service is used within a hypothetical 
auction in our experiment, reported to the subject. 
User-Provided Picture A dummy variable indicating if a hypothetical auction in our experiment displays 
a user-customized picture (User-Provided Picture = 1), or a stock photo (User-
Provided Picture = 0), reported to the subject. 
eBay Hosted A dummy variable indicating if a hypothetical auction in our experiment is hosted 
by eBay (eBay Hosted = 1) versus CrazyAuctions, a newly created auction house 
(eBay Hosted = 0), reported to the subject 
Allows PayPal A dummy variable indicating if a hypothetical auction in our experiment uses 
PayPal in an auction (Allows PayPal = 1), a well-known payment handling 
institution, reported to the subject. 
Allows ChargeBuddy A dummy variable indicating if a hypothetical auction in our experiment uses 
ChargeBuddy, a newly created pay service for this experiment (Allows 
ChargeBuddy = 1). 
Allows Credit Card A dummy variable indicating if a hypothetical auction in our experiment allows a 
credit card for purchases, reported to the subject. 
Number of Bidders The number of bidders that a hypothetical auction receives in our experiment, 
reported to the subject. 
 
Survey Data Analysis  
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) has become widely used over the last three decades to analyze data in the 
behavioral or social sciences (Bollen, 1983; Galletta, Henry, McCoy, & Polak, 2006; Jöreskog, 1971; Ryu, 2011). 
Ryu (2011) argued that SEM is excellent for assessing the goodness of fit of a theoretical model as well as for 
estimating parameters in a hypothesized model, especially in the presence of unobservable latent constructs 
difficult or impossible to observe directly. Using the standard SEM methodology, we first evaluated our 
measurement model for convergent and discriminant validity; then the structural model was assessed for model 
fit (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Gefen et al., 2003). 
Our survey instruments were rooted deeply in previous research. Table 6 shows the results of our factor 
analysis. A Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization was used, and results converged in five iterations. A 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted to examine the fit of the measurement model. The CFA 
showed 2 of 104.54 (p < .001). Internal consistency was relatively strong, with a minimum Cronbach’s alpha of 
.83, and the standardized factor loadings for the empirical model were all significant (p < .001), which supports 
the convergent validity of the indicators (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Ba & Johansson, 2008).  
Table 6 – Factor Loadings from Factor Analysis 
 Institutional-Based 
Trust 
Experience Propensity for 
Innovation 
Propensity 
for Search 
Trust3 0.887 0.061 -0.210 0.016 
Trust1 0.835 -0.081 0.034 -0.151 
Trust2 0.786 0.025 -0.065 0.000 
TimePart -0.002 1.000 0.006 0.002 
TimeWon -0.035 0.996 0.016 -0.015 
HowLong 0.131 0.806 0.015 0.068 
Innov3 -0.067 -0.023 0.899 0.018 
Innov1 -0.041 0.097 0.849 -0.148 
Innov2 -0.006 -0.051 0.731 0.119 
SrchPrev -0.067 -0.043 -0.076 0.917 
SrchCurr 0.040 0.116 -0.044 0.710 
 
Fornell and Larker (1981) proposed a conservative test for discriminant validity called Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE). It is based on the premise that estimates of convergent latent variables should have more than 
50% of their variability explained by the factors that load upon them. Using Fornell and Larker’s measurements, 
all the AVEs of our latent constructs save one exceed their 50% threshold. The exception is propensity for 
innovation, which has an AVE of 48.3%, very near the 50% cutoff. However, O’Rourke and Hatcher (2013) 
suggested that the AVE test is conservative and may cause rejection of valid loadings (i.e., false negatives are 
possible or even likely). They suggested a pairwise discriminant validity check that uses a χ 2 difference test to 
further assess discriminant validity. Our χ 2 difference test for propensity for innovation returned a χ 2 of 45.9 
with 21 degrees of freedom for a p-value < .01, providing evidence of discriminant validity. 
Figure 3 shows the structural model we used to examine the observed bid levels entered by the subjects in our 
experiment. This model was created by combining the stimuli from our experiment (darkly shaded), the subject 
responses in our experiment (orange), and the subject responses in our survey (not shaded). 
 
Figure 3 – Structural Equation Model 
In the model, control variables set by the experiment are shaded. Stata 12.0 was used for SEM analysis and for 
Figure 3. The bidder reacts to different stimuli within the experiment, shown in each darkly shaded box. The 
values for these variables were predetermined for the bidder for the online experiment. The two choices made 
by the bidder in our experiment, bid level and search in experiment, are shaded in orange. These two choices 
are actions taken by the bidder during the auction experiment. Search in Experiment loaded well with self-
reported variables from the survey. We used the bid level as a dependent variable. Survey variables are 
unshaded. Rectangular text boxes indicate observed variables, and ovals indicate latent variables. Note that 
testing institutional-based trust, propensity for innovation, or experience within the experiment would vastly 
complicate the experiment; therefore, we relegated the estimation of these constructs to self-reported answers 
from the survey.  
Table 7 – Structural Equation Model Results 
Variable Hypothesis Coefficient OIM Std. Err. Z-stat 
Dependent Variable: Institutional-Based Trust     
Experience H2 0.113 0.008 14.02*** 
Propensity for Search  0.247 0.011 22.03*** 
Propensity for Innovation  0.097 0.007 13.37*** 
Dependent Variable: Bid Level     
Constant  74.850 2.447 30.59*** 
Institution-Based Trust H3 14.597 1.118 13.06*** 
Bidder Experience H1 -5.031 0.651 -7.73*** 
Seller Experience  0.046 0.018 2.59*** 
Seller Reputation  12.924 1.888 6.85*** 
Escrow  2.904 1.225 2.37*** 
User-Provided Picture  -2.767 1.225 -2.26*** 
eBay Hosted  1.695 1.225 1.38 
Allows PayPal  0.559 1.775 0.31*** 
Allows ChargeBuddy  -1.287 1.775 -0.73*** 
Allows Credit Card  -2.207 1.342 -1.64*** 
Number of Bidders  0.087 0.085 1.02*** 
 
Table 7 shows that that experience is associated with reduced bid levels as hypothesized in H1 and supports H2 
in that experience leads to an increase in a subject’s institutional-based trust. H3 is also supported, showing 
institutional-based trust having a positive effect on bid levels. As expected, we also show support for the control 
variables (i.e., that a bidder’s propensity for search has a positive effect on both experience and on institutional-
based trust, and a bidder’s propensity for innovation has a positive effect on a bidder’s institutional-based trust). 
Our results show a bidder’s experience has a direct negative effect on bid level, but institutional-based trust has 
a positive mediating effect on this relationship. Furthermore, the seller’s experience has a positive effect. 
The structural model shows that each of the factors load on our final model with strong significance. The RMSEA 
of the model is 0.033, well below the 0.08 cutoff suggested by Jarvenpaa et al. (1998), indicating strong model 
fit. In addition, the correlation matrix between latent constructs shown in Table 8 shows no significant 
correlation between the latent constructs. 
Table 8 – Correlation Matrix for Latent Variables 
 
Experience Propensity for 
Innovation 
Institutional-Based Trust Propensity for Search 
Experience 1.00 
   
Propensity for Innovation 0.24 1.00 
  
Institution-Based Trust 0.30 0.28 1.00 
 
Propensity for Search 0.36 0.18 0.28 1.00 
 
Although previous research into traditional auctions suggests that bidders reduce their bid levels as they gain 
experience (Kagel & Richard, 2001), insights from our experiment imply that experience can have a positive 
effect on bid levels as trust increases. Presumably this occurs because of the increased importance of trust in 
online environments in which a bidder is forced to rely on institutional structures to guarantee an anonymous 
seller’s claims about product quality, delivery, and service. Hence a seller’s experience and reported reputation 
showed an increase in the bid level. A bidder puts a premium on a seller’s experience and strong reputation as 
well as on the structure in place to protect the bidder and uses these factors as an indication that it is worth 
paying a premium to get the winning bid. 
We found a propensity to innovate leads to an increased level of institutional-based trust because those who 
consider themselves innovative are more likely to trust online institutions. We also found that searching (both 
self-reported and observed in our experiment) leads to higher levels of institutional-based trust and experience. 
In addition, although other research contends that established institutions, like eBay and PayPal, should 
command higher bid levels (Brynjolfsson & Smith, 2000; Kauffman & Wood, 2007), our findings are consistent 
with the results of Stewart (2003) and Kim (2008). They found that the institutional-based trust which certain 
individuals develop for one online institution can be transferrable to similar institutions. We show that 
experienced bidders exhibit higher levels of institutional-based trust. However, we found little or no evidence to 
support the contention that the institutions themselves seem to generate larger bid levels because we found no 
significant difference in our subjects’ bid levels between eBay auctions and our fictional CrazyAuctions. Similarly, 
no significant difference was found in bid levels when a bidder was restricted to using only our ChargeBuddy 
instead of PayPal. It is possible that these results could be because of a transfer of institutional-based trust in 
which experience in any auction can translate to higher institutional-based trust in all auction house institutions. 
However, more research is needed in this area before such statements can be made conclusively. We urge 
future research to more closely examine the effect that brand name marketplaces have on prices and bid levels 
by using similar experiments to simulate real-world auctions rather than self-reporting of the importance of 
brand name. Note, however, that escrow is significant, thus indicating that although trust in standard 
institutional practices may be transferred to similar institutions, explicitly providing additional institutional-
based services, like escrow, may lead to higher bid levels. 
From the two studies, we have posited that bidding learning is initially very low and that the proposed trusting 
behavior is low in online environments but will increase with experience. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that 
eventually trust will be developed to a point beyond which further experience will have little impact on the trust 
level and its effect on a bidder’s bid levels. It also stands to reason that experience will continue to increase 
bidders’ skills as more participants enter an auction. Thus, the levels of bidding skills will continue to increase 
even after institutional-based trust levels off. Hence, bidders with a relatively high level of experience appear to 
establish a sufficient level of institutional-based trust and thus appear to be able to win auctions at lower bid 
levels. This is consistent with research findings by Easley, Wood, and Barkataki (2010) that bidders gravitate 
toward more profitable bidding strategies as their experience increases.  
Overall Analysis 
The results shown in Table 3 and Figure 2 demonstrate a nonmonotonic relationship between experience and 
bid levels. As new customers enter an electronic market, the prices they are willing to pay are reduced, which is 
consistent with the low level of initial trust predicted by trust theory (McKnight et al., 2002). As such, on 
average, electronic market retailers will not be able to charge as much as traditional retailers, despite more 
convenience and better price information, until the lack of trust is overcome. Then, as buyers become used to 
online environments and gain experience with successfully completed transactions, we theorize that buyers 
place more trust in the online auction market structure. This familiarization and subsequent trust then result in 
higher bid levels for an item, but this situation is short-lived because these sane buyers soon start to demand 
lower prices as they become experienced in searching out bargains. 
Because we incorporated theories of trust and experience, our results differ from those in traditional auctions as 
reported by Kagel and Richard (2001). We believe this difference is explained by an intrinsic difference in 
information flow between traditional (offline) auctions and online auctions. In traditional auctions, trust may not 
be as important to bidders. Often, the item is viewable and can be inspected before the bidding begins. 
Conversely, in online auctions, a bidder must rely on a seller’s word about the quality of the item, delivery times, 
etc. From previous discussion on the degree of information asymmetry, if a seller is not forthcoming with certain 
information or does not deliver the item as promised, the buyer must rely on structural guarantees provided by 
the institution (penalties, reputational repercussions, information for lawsuits, etc.) for restitution. Thus, 
although traditional auction research shows that experience has a negative effect on bid levels, Figure 2 shows 
this effect is not nearly as clear-cut in online auctions and at lower levels of bidder experience additional 
experience leads to a willingness to pay more for an item. 
These findings have design implications. The results emphasize the importance for sellers to seek out institutions 
with an established user base; it is equally important that institutions convey to bidders the institutional-based 
structures that inspire bidders to trust the institution. In addition, although sellers typically pay the commissions 
on transactions to an auction house, auction houses can increase their profitability by designing auctions with 
incentives for repeat experienced buyers. Our results also indicate that auction houses can engender more trust 
from buyers by encouraging buyers to also sell items in online auctions. 
Conclusion 
This paper examines the interplay of institutional-based trust and its effects on auction bid levels. It also 
examines the separate effects on bid levels of selling and bidding experiences. To perform our research, we used 
actual auction data to analyze the winning bids in our field study data. We staged an experiment in which 
subjects entered bids for the same auction item and conducted a survey to gather information about the 
subjects. Multiple research methods allowed us to make many contributions. Our results show a direct negative 
effect between winning bid levels and experience, indicating — as has been shown in traditional offline auctions 
— that bidders become better at bidding as their experience increases. However, we also show that in online 
auctions institutional-based trust mediates the relationship between experience and bid level, making 
untrusting bidders deeply discount their bids until they develop sufficient institutional-based trust. Taken 
together, these results demonstrate a conflicting effect of experience on bid levels: The effect of experience on 
bids is significantly positive at low levels of experience and nondescript at middle ranges of experience; 
presumably the lack of significant effect at the middle ranges reflects a period during which the trust is being 
developed that eventually increases willingness to pay. However, as a bidder’s experience continues to increase, 
the heightened skills at finding the best bargains decreases that bidder’s willingness to pay.  Consequently, 
experience becomes negatively significant at high levels of experience.  
We found that inexperienced bidders tend to greatly discount their bid amounts. However, as they gain more 
experience, their level of institutional-based trust increases and leads to higher bid levels. This is contrary to 
what research has shown in traditional auctions (e.g. see Ball, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1991; Dyer & Kagel, 1996; 
Kagel & Richard, 2001). We also found that both personal experience and viewing other successful transactions 
appear to have a strong effect on building institutional-based trust. Nevertheless, the existence of a brand-name 
institution appears to have little or no effect on institutional-based trust. Although we suspect bidders may be 
attracted to brand names, exploration of that suspicion is beyond the scope of this study. However, whatever 
the answer may be about initial attraction, our results show that once bidders arrive at an auction site, their bid 
levels apparently are unaffected by the existence of a brand name.  
Our findings support a contention that bidders develop institutional-based trust at moderate levels of bidder 
experience, but the ability to win auctions with the lowest bids comes at relatively high levels of experience.  
Previous research shows that in traditional offline auctions inexperienced bidders tend to overbid (Ball et al., 
1991; Dyer & Kagel, 1996; Kagel & Richard, 2001). Our results show that in an online environment trust becomes 
a more salient factor than in traditional offline environments. The absence of trust online provokes the opposite 
reaction, in which inexperienced bidders tend to bid less than those with more experience and thus avoid 
transactions that more experienced bidders would find profitable. We posit that this result is because of the 
large degree of information asymmetry in online environments and that this asymmetry is less pronounced in 
the traditional offline marketplace. The online information imbalance can permit a seller to mask personal or 
product characteristics that buyers in “bricks-and-mortar” environments would be likelier to discover in viewing 
products and talking to sellers. This information asymmetry has been discussed in previous research in 
electronic markets (Ba & Pavlou, 2002; Dellarocas & Wood, 2008), but we believe our results distinctly and 
sharply delineate this difference between online and traditional environments. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This research has limitations that call for further investigation. First, our research only applies to public valuation 
auctions in which bidders tend to share some sort of criteria for valuation and should not be applied to private 
value auctions in which users develop their own valuation. We used rare coins in our field study because coin 
collectors and dealers either purchase for resale (making the auction, by definition, a public valuation auction) 
or have access to external information sources that describe what a specific rare coin should be worth. Although 
we used a technological device for our experiment that generates similar results, we encourage future 
researchers to examine institutional-based trust in other online domains. Further, because we studied 
transactions that are exclusively online, our results are more generalizable to the online community than to the 
general population. 
One limitation of our study is that we only observed winning bid levels on eBay auctions. We were unable to 
observe losing bids and discern how much a bidder learns through making both winning and losing bids. Another 
limitation of our field study is that comments were not left for every transaction. Moreover, it is possible that 
bidders can establish different identities, thereby masking their experience levels. Based on a Monte Carlo 
simulation conducted outside of this research, such behavior will lead to understated significance levels at the 
upper end; thus, although we did find significance, the results of experience in decreasing bid levels may be 
even stronger than we have indicated. 
We assumed in our field study that bidders who distrust an online auction will cease to bid there. We also 
assumed that online survey participants with more experience in auctions gained that experience because of 
positive reinforcement. Although this is not necessarily true, our results bear out that those with more 
experience tend to bid higher, giving support to this contention. 
For our latent constructs, we relied on self-reporting by the respondents. Researchers point out that reliance 
solely on survey responses can result in common method bias (CMB) in which, in our case, a respondent can 
misreport propensity to innovate, experience, or trust. Researchers lack consensus on the importance of CMB. 
Some argue its effect is trivial or insignificant (Crampton & Wagner, 1994; Meade, Watson, & Kroustalis, 2007; 
Spector & Trantenberg, 2011). Others contend CMB can significantly affect results (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2004; 
P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). To alleviate some of the potential CMB, we incorporated 
an experiment with our survey that permitted us to observe respondents’ bid levels instead of using their self-
reported bid levels, and we also used observed search patterns in conjunction with reported search habits. 
However, the nature of our experiment required some simplicity, and test fatigue was a concern. Thus, the 
remaining constructs were determined solely by using survey responses. 
We used cross-sectional data for this research. Within that cross-sectional data, respondents (in the survey) and 
auction participants (in the field study) have experience levels. As such, we cannot state definitively that an 
individual develops trust as he or she gains experience, but only that individuals with more experience tend to 
have more trust, which is a weaker statement. Consequently, our results are not quite as powerful as could be 
achieved with longitudinal data. But our results are indicative and suggestive that future research could show 
that as a single individual develops experience, that individual develops trust. We call for future research using 
longitudinal data within a field study to examine changes in bid levels as an individual bidder gains experience. 
Although we did not examine electronic markets other than online auctions, our results may extend to other 
forms of electronic commerce. We call for more examination of nonauction environments in which institutional-
based trust can affect a buyer’s willingness to pay. Our study has implications for managers as well; it may be 
profitable for them to take steps to quickly establish trust and then cater to customers who have recently 
developed trust. 
In addition, we recognize that the theories we rely upon are based on valuations that are affiliated with other 
bidders, so that one bidder’s valuation of a coin is often similar to another bidder’s valuation of the same coin 
(this is often referred to as a “common valuation,” and does not indicate identical valuation, but rather 
correlated valuation based on outside factors, such as market valuation). Previous empirical research shows that 
bidders do indeed have affiliated values in rare coin online auctions (Bajari & Hortacsu, 2003; Easley et al., 
2010), probably because of several factors, including the potential for resale (which is always considered a 
common valuation) and the existence of numerous pricing guides available at coin shops, drugstores, groceries, 
and newsstands. In addition, we designed our experiment to elicit common valuation by suggesting that there is 
a “right bid” for the bidders to bid rather than the bidders trying to add the product to their own collections. 
However, although we agree with previous empirical research on this topic, we recognize that wildly differing 
personal valuations of the same rare coin would reduce the generalizability of our findings, and so we limited 
our research to specific coins (denomination, year, place of mint, mint marks, and condition) that were sold at 
least five times during the period of this study. This allows bidders to at least review past auction and auction 
bid levels. 
In summary, our research makes several important contributions to the online trust and auction literature. First, 
we demonstrate how online and traditional offline auctions are intrinsically different. Research shows that 
inexperienced bidders in traditional (offline) auctions tend to overbid, whereas our research shows that 
inexperienced bidders in online auctions tend to underbid. Second, our results show that the effect of 
experience is nonmonotonic—inexperienced bidders under bid and moderately experienced bidders tend to bid 
higher, but bidders with the highest levels of experience bid lower than moderately experienced bidders. Third, 
our research identifies the lack of institutional-based trust as a possible explanation for this conflicting effect of 
experience. On the one hand, the lack of trust in the online auction market structure underlies inexperienced 
bidders’ low bids. On the other hand, bidders with more experience appear to develop more institutional-based 
trust over time, which leads to a willingness to bid higher. However, once institutional-based trust is fully 
developed and its impact levels off, experienced bidders seem to acquire additional skills that allow them to find 
better deals. Thus, these highly experienced bidders bid at lower levels than moderately experienced bidders.  
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Appendix 
Survey Questions 
In our survey, participants were asked the following 11 questions on a 7-point Likert scale in which we 
randomized the order of each question. The default format for each question had leftmost choice (“1” on the 
Likert scale) for “Strongly Disagree,” the center choice (“4” on the Likert scale) for “Neutral” and the rightmost 
choice of “Strongly Agree” (“7” on the Likert scale).  
Institution-based Trust (adapted from McKnight et al., 2002) 
• Trust1: I feel assured that payment through a third-party payment service such as PayPal or 
ChargeBuddy protects me from fraudulent sellers. 
• Trust2: Online auction sites have enough safeguards to make me feel comfortable using it to transact 
personal business. 
• Trust3: I feel assured that legal and technological structures adequately protect me from problems on 
online auction sites. 
 
Propensity for Innovation (adapted from Agarwal & Prasad, 1998) 
• Innov1: Among my peers, I am usually the first to explore new information technologies. 
• Innov2: If I heard about a new information technology, I would look for ways to experiment with it. 
• Innov3: I like to experiment with new information technologies. 
 
Propensity for Search 
• SearchPrev: I usually examine previous auctions that sold a similar item before bidding on an item. 
• SearchCurrent: I usually examine current auctions selling a similar item before bidding on an item. 
 
When gauging experience, we used a question format that differed from the Likert-type format: 
HowLong: How long have you been participating in online auctions? 
• Never  
• Less than a month  
• One to six months  
• Six months to one year  
• More than one year  
 
TimePart: How many times have you participated in an online auction?  
• Never  
• 1-5 times  
• 5-20 times  
• 20-100 times  
• more than 100 times  
 
TimeWon: How many times have you won an online auction?  
• Never  
• 1-5 times  
• 5-20 times  
• 20-100 times  
• more than 100 times  
 
 
